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ﺍﻟﻤﻠﺨﺺ
ﺇﻥﺍﻟﺒﺤﻮﺙﺍﻟﺘﺠﺮﻳﺒﻴﺔﺍﻟﻤﺒﻨﻴﺔﻋﻠﻰﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔﻣﻦﺍﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭﻛﻴﻦﻭﺗﻘﻴﻴﻢﻛﻔﺎﺀﺓﻛﻞﻃﺎﻟﺐ،
ﺃﻭﻣﺘﺪﺭﺏ،ﺃﻭﻣﻬﻨﻲﻓﻲﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉﻣﺤﺪﺩ،ﺗﺸﺘﺮﻙﻓﻲﺃﻣﺮﻭﺍﺣﺪﻋﻠﻰﺍﻷﻗﻞ؛ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ
ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪﺍﻷﺩﻟﺔﺍﻟﻤﺆﻳﺪﺓﺃﻭﺍﻟﻤﻀﺎﺩﺓﻟﻠﻔﺮﺿﻴﺔﺑﺄﺧﺬﺃﺟﺰﺍﺀﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔﻣﻦﺍﻷﺩﻟﺔﻓﻲ
ﺍﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭﺑﻌﻨﺎﻳﺔﻭﺗﻜﺎﻣﻠﻬﺎﻟﺨﻠﻖﻗﺼﺔﻣﺘﻤﺎﺳﻜﺔﺑﻼﺗﻨﺎﻗﻀﺎﺕ،ﻭﻻﺃﻃﺮﺍﻑﻏﻴﺮ
ﻣﺘﺮﺍﺑﻄﺔ،ﻭﻻﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮﻣﻔﻘﻮﺩﺓ.ﻭﻟﺘﺄﻣﻴﻦﺇﻃﺎﺭﺗﻔﻜﻴﺮﻱﻣﺘﻤﺎﺳﻚﻟﻬﺬﻩﺍﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ،ﺗﻘﺪﻡ
ﻫﺬﺍﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﻟﺔﻧﺴﺨﺔﻣﻌﺪﻟﺔﻣﻦﻧﻈﺮﻳﺔﺍﺳُﺘﺨﺪﻣﺖﻛﻨﻤﻮﺫﺝﻻﺗﺨﺎﺫﺍﻟﻘﺮﺍﺭﺍﺕﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ
ﻓﻲﺍﻟﺤﺎﻻﺕﺍﻟﺠﻨﺎﺋﻴﺔ؛ﻧﻈﺮﻳﺔﺍﻟﺮﻭﺍﻳﺎﺕﺍﻟﺮﺍﺳﻴﺔ.ﻓﻲﻫﺬﻩﺍﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔﻳﻘﻮﻡﺍﻟﻘﻀﺎﺓﻓﻲ
ﻗﻀﻴﺔﻣﺎ،ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻜﻢﻋﻠﻰﺟﻮﺩﺓﺃﺟﺰﺍﺀﻣﻦﺍﻷﺩﻟﺔ،ﻭﻣﺎﺇﺫﺍﻛﺎﻥﻣﻦﺍﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦﺗﺜﺒﻴﺖﺗﻠﻚ
ﺍﻷﺟﺰﺍﺀﻛﺮﻭﺍﻳﺎﺕﺗﺸﻜﻞﺳﻠﺴﻠﺔﻣﻦﺍﻷﺩﻟﺔُﺗﻤﻜﻦﻣﻦﺍﻟﺘﻮﺻﻞﺇﻟﻰﻗﺮﺍﺭﻻﻳﺪﻉ
ﻣﺠﺎﻻﻟﻠﺸﻚﺑُﺠﺮﻡﺍﻟﻤﺘﻬﻢ.ﺗﻮﻓﺮﻫﺬﻩﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﻟﺔﺃﻣﺜﻠﺔﻣﻦﺍﻟﻤﺠﺎﻝﺍﻟﻄﺒﻲﻹﻳﻀﺎﺡﻛﻴﻒ
ﻳﻤﻜﻦﻟﻨﺴﺨﺔﻣﻌﺪﻟﺔﻣﻦﻫﺬﻩﺍﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔﺃﻥﺗﻮﻓﺮﺇﻃﺎﺭﺍﻓﻜﺮﻳﺎﻟﻠﺒﺎﺣﺜﻴﻦﻭﺍﻟﻤﺮﺑﻴﻦﻳﻜﻮﻥ
ﻓﻴﻬﺎﺗﻘﻴﻴﻢﻛﻞﻣﻦﺍﻟﺒﺤﺚﺍﻟﺘﺠﺮﻳﺒﻲﻭﺍﻟﻜﻔﺎﺀﺓﻓﻲﺍﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔﺩﺍﺋﻤﺎﺣﻜﻤﺎﻣﻬﻨﻴﺎﻧﻮﻋﻴﺎﻣﺒﻨﻴﺎ
ﻋﻠﻰﺩﻣﺞﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔﻣﻦﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕﺍﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔﻭﺍﻟﻜﻤﻴﺔ.
ﺍﻟﻜﻠﻤﺎﺕﺍﻟﻤﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ:ﺍﻟﻄﺐ؛ﺍﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻢﺍﻟﻄﺒﻲ؛ﻧﻈﺮﻳﺔﺍﻟﺮﻭﺍﻳﺎﺕﺍﻟﺮﺍﺳﻴﺔ؛ﻗﺼﺔ؛ﺩﻟﻴﻞ
Abstract
Empirical research based on groups of participants and
assessment of the competence of individual students,
trainees, and professionals in a given context have at least
one thing in common: evidence in favour or against a
hypothesis should be established by carefully considering
and integrating various pieces of evidence to create a
coherent story that has no contradictions, loose ends or
missing elements. To provide a coherent framework for
this process, this article introduces a modified version of a
theory that has been used as a model of legal decision
making in criminal cases: the theory of anchored narra-
tives. In this theory, judges in a case judge the quality of
pieces of evidence and whether these pieces of evidence
can be anchored as narratives to form a chain of evidence
that enables a decision beyond reasonable doubt
regarding a suspect’s guilt. This article provides examples
from the domain of medicine to elaborate how a modified
version of this theory can provide researchers and edu-
cators with a framework in which the assessment of both
empirical research and competence is a qualitative pro-
fessional judgement based on an integration of various
sources of qualitative and quantitative information.
Keywords: Evidence; Medicine; Medical education; Story;
Theory of anchored narratives
 2017 The Author.
Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Taibah
University. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
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Introduction
Empirical research never occurs in vacuum; theory,
potentially relevant previous research, setting, and interests
and expectations emerging from ongoing intellectual dia-
logue and multilogue place a given empirical study in a
particular context that has implications for the meaning of
findings within and beyond the study. Likewise, assessment
of the competence of students, trainees, and professionals
occurs in a given context in which a variety of assessments
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are undertaken. In fact, whether we consider research on
clinical reasoning,1 legal decision making in a criminal case,2
research in education,3 or the assessment of the medical
competence of individual students, residents or
professionals,4 the Latin adagio unus testis nullus testis is
key: decisions ought not be based on a single source of
information. Hence, whether we consider the evidence
derived from empirical research with groups of participants
or the assessment of learning or performance (e.g., current
competence or an increase in competence in a given time
interval), evidence in favour or against any given
hypothesis ought to be established through a careful
consideration and integration of a variety of pieces of
evidence into a coherent story that has no contradictions,
loose ends or missing elements.
For instance, tomake appropriate decisions with regard to
the medical conditions and needs of a patient who reports
acute and severe chest pain, clinicians and other individuals
(e.g., nurses and residents) have to ask the right questions,
perform physical examinations, and think about possible di-
agnoses and other steps while continuously monitoring a
patient’s blood pressure, pulse rate, and respiration.5 In a
research field, the meaning and implications of findings
from a scientific study are established through the context in
which a study has taken place, previous research relevant to
the study at hand, and contemporary theory.3 In the context
of the assessment of medical competence, professionals have
to arrive at well-founded decisions about an individual’s
competence in a given context using qualitative and quanti-
tative indicators of learning and performance from a variety
of sources, which include objective, structured clinical ex-
aminations (OSCEs),1 progress test scores,6 course exams,
interviews, and feedback from supervisors, patients or others.
In each of the aforementioned contexts e clinical
reasoning, criminal law practice, educational research or the
assessment of medical competence e multiple pieces of evi-
dence have to be integrated into a chain of evidence that
provides a coherent study with which professional judges e
clinicians, judges or jury members, researchers and educa-
tional practitioners, and medical assessors e can make well-
founded decisions. These decisions can pertain to the health
status and needs of a patient (i.e., clinical case), the guilt or
innocence of a suspect (i.e., criminal case), implications of
research findings for theory, future research and educational
practice (i.e., educational research), and the competence of a
student, resident or professional (i.e., assessment of medical
competence), respectively. Whatever practice we consid-
erdand whether we address mainly qualitative or predomi-
nantly quantitative informationdnothing operates in a
vacuum: context is key.
This article introduces a modified version of a theory that
was developed by legal psychologists Wagenaar, Van Kop-
pen, and Crombag2 as a model of legal decision making in a
criminal case: the theory of anchored narratives (henceforth:
TAN). In TAN, judges subsequently judge the quality of
pieces of evidence (i.e., stories) and whether these pieces of
evidence can be anchored as narratives to form a chain of
evidence (i.e., a coherent story) that enables judges to
decide beyond reasonable doubt about a suspect’s guilt or
innocence. After a concise presentation of TAN, using a
criminal case example, this article introduces a modified
version of TAN for the context of educational research and
assessment, and discusses this modified version in light of
the contemporary validity frameworks of Kane7 and
Messick8 as well as current views on workplace learning
and assessment.9e11 Given its resonance with these
frameworks, TAN provides a framework for the evaluation
of the strength of evidence e in favour or against a given
hypothesis e which underlines that the assessment of both
empirical research and competence is in the end always a
qualitative professional judgement based on an integration
of a variety of qualitative and quantitative information.
In TAN, a judge comes to a decision concerning the guilt
or innocence of a suspect in two stages. At the first stage,
individual pieces of evidence, handed over to the prosecution
and defence, are judged in terms of plausibility and quality.
Subsequently, at the second stage, these pieces of evidence
are evaluated in terms of how well they can be integrated or
anchored into facts, common sense, and related to other
pieces of evidence at hand. Each individual piece of evidence
can reach the second stage (i.e., that of anchoring) only if a
good and plausible story can be provided with it, and suc-
cessful anchoring requires that this story be integrated into a
chain of evidence. Take the following example, adopted and
modified from3:
Dr. X. is found dead e with a single shot through the
forehead e in the backyard of his house, and forensic
examination reveals a match in DNA between suspect Dr.
Y. and a piece of cigarette found in the backyard of Dr. X.
In essence, a DNA match provides a potentially decisive
piece of evidence. That is, if we can provide at least one piece
of evidenceeand preferably several other pieces of evidence
that provide a chain of evidencedpointing at Dr. Y. being at
the crime scene at or around the time of the death of Dr. X.,
the DNA match can be considered sufficient evidence to put
Dr. Y. in jail. This evidence can come from eyewitnesses who
report that they observed Dr. Y. at the crime scene around
the time of the critical event, from others who report that Dr.
Y. was not at home or in office as expected around that time,
from global positioning system (GPS) data from a mobile
device, and even other sources. What these sources of evi-
dence have in common is that they allow the DNA match to
be anchored in a coherent story line that can support in-
terpretations of the DNA match in terms of Dr. Y. killing
Dr. X. At the same time, one solid piece of evidence that
points either against the presence of Dr. Y. at the crime scene
around the time of the critical event or against the involve-
ment of Dr. Y in the death of Dr. X. in some other way may
have the potential to take stories about the guilt of Dr. Y. off
the table. Other pieces of evidence may need to be examined
in order to discard, beyond reasonable doubt, alternative
scenarios such as the piece of cigarette being collected and
put at the crime scene by someone who wants to set up Dr. Y.
or the piece of cigarette having been dropped by Dr. Y. at a
previous meeting between Dr. X. and Dr. Y. in Dr. X.’s
backyard. Figure 1 provides an example of TAN in this
example case.
TAN not only provides a model to explain decision
making in successfully solved cases but also provides a model
to explain miscarriages of justice, as a miscarriage of justice
can usually be explained in terms of a judge (or jury, for that
matter) either misjudging the quality or plausibility of
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evidence (i.e., first stage) or inappropriately anchoring one or
more pieces of evidence (i.e., second stage).2
Conceptual and measurement questions in educational
research
In a modified form, TAN also applies to the evaluation of
the strength of evidence for or against assumptions and hy-
potheses in empirical research. For example, take the wide-
spread use of questionnaires, tests, and other psychometric
instruments in the field of medical education. Whether we
address knowledge progress testing,6 the evaluation of
clinical teaching,12 seminar learning experiences,13 culture
in medical schools,14 peer feedback,15 cognitive load5 or
another construct, researchers frequently use psychometric
instruments when they attempt to measure the construct(s)
of interest. However, researchers at times forget that
‘validating’ an instrument is about a structured sequence of
steps that together provide a chain of evidence7,8 regarding
the validity of an instrument (i.e., whether it measures
what it is supposed to measure).
Logical relations between measures
The recent Standards and Guidelines for Validation prac-
tices16 are heavily influenced by Messick’s8 unitary view of
validity, in which construct validity or “the extent to which
the relations among items, domains, and concepts support
a priori hypotheses about the logical relations that should
exist with other measures” (Ref. [16], p. 14) is the central
component in validation research. Sources of evidence
comprised in this component are test content, response
processes, internal structure, relations to other variables
and consequences of testing. Let us, to consider an
example, focus on one of these e relations to other
variables. This step is frequently omitted or not carried out
rigorously: a careful study of how scores on an instrument
under consideration relate to variables that are either
known to measure the construct of interest or that e based
on solid theory and previous research e can be expected to
be strongly related to that construct.
Towards a stable instrument score (Y)
To develop an instrument, researchers need to carefully
undertake a number of steps17,18: literature review,
interviews and/or focus groups, synthesis of outcomes of
the previous, item development, expert validation,
cognitive pretesting and pilot testing. The latter step, pilot
testing, should first aim at obtaining stable factors, that
is, sets of items that can be grouped together as
measuring the same underlying variables or constructs
(e.g.,5,12e15). For this purpose, we can use factors
analysis19 or item response theory models20 when we
assume our constructs to be continuous (e.g., cognitive
load), and we can use latent class analysis21 or latent
profile analysis22 for constructs that we assume to be
categorical (e.g., opinions about particular topics).
Having stable factors is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for being able to measure the constructs we are
interested in. In other words, once we have stable factors,
it is time to make the next move. For ease, this article
focuses not on a multi-factor instrument5,12e15 but on a
single-factor instrument: in a hypothetical study, a group
of researchers has developed (cf. [17,18]) five self-rating
items that are supposed to measure cognitive load experi-
enced by students while performing an OSCE, and factor
analysis on different samples of students indicates the same
Figure 1: Concise depiction of the theory of anchored narratives through an example.
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one-factor solution across samples. Hence, the ratings of
the five items can be grouped together to obtain a single
score Y for each respondent.
How Y relates to other variables (Z)
To examine whether this score Y really is an indicator of
cognitive load experienced by students while performing an
OSCE, we need to study carefully how Y (a) relates to vari-
ables that are known to measure the construct of interest or
(b) relates to variables that e based on solid theory and
previous research e can be expected to be strongly related to
that construct, henceforth: Z. In the context of cognitive
load, an example of (a) is found in secondary task measures5:
students then perform a simple secondary task (e.g., pushing
a button when there is a signal on a screen) that is unrelated
to the primary task while they are carrying out the primary
task. In the OSCE example, for instance, students could be
instructed to focus on the OSCE and to push a button on a
device within hand’s reach every time the screen of that
device lights up. Reduced accuracy and slower
performance on the secondary task are known indicators
of increased cognitive load.5 At the same time, as an
increased cognitive load from the primary task tends to
result in more errors and/or slower performance on that
primary task, an example of (b) is the performance on the
primary task, in our case the OSCE.
Conversely, had the researchers’ interest not been in a
cognitive load instrument but in the development of a test for
clinical reasoning during OSCE performance instead, with
regard to (a) they could have done a literature search on
known measures of clinical reasoning in OSCEs or similar
examinations, and a cognitive load measure might have been
included for (b).5
Manipulating an experimental treatment factor (X) to
which Y and Z commonly respond
Observing a correlation between Y and Z (a and/or b) in
itself does not provide many support regarding the
assumption that Y is about our construct of interest; several
unmeasured variables may resonate in the correlation
observed. However, cognitive load theory has resulted in a
wide variety of well-designed randomized controlled experi-
ments that clearly indicate that, across settings, cognitive
load and performance (i.e., Y and Z) commonly respond to
manipulations in task complexity5: an increase in complexity
typically results in an increased cognitive load and a decrease
in performance (i.e., reduced accuracy and/or slower
performance). In other words, if we design a randomized
controlled experiment for the sole purpose of validation, in
which we randomly assign a large group of students to
either of two OSCE conditions that provide exactly the
same instruction to students and vary only in the
complexity of the case (i.e., low vs. high complexity), we
should find the highest Y and lowest Z scores in the high-
complexity condition. With this finding, we gain some sup-
port for the assumption that Y is about cognitive load; if the
pattern of condition differences is a different one, we fail to
gain that support. Figure 2 summarizes the story.
In Figure 2, Z is a known measure of cognitive load, X is
an experimental manipulation which in cognitive load theory
research has resulted in differences in cognitive load before,5
and Y is the score of a new instrument that is intended to
Chain of evidence (overall story): Y is a measure of cognitive load
Empirical support for the correlation 
between Y and Z
Manipulating X induces known 
changes in cognitive load
Y results from 
a set of items 
that form a 
stable factor
Z indicates 
cognitive load 
through 
secondary task 
performance
Z varies 
across 
conditions of 
X in expected 
direction
Y also
varies 
across 
conditions 
of X in 
expected 
direction
Knowledge of the world and rules of common sense
Figure 2: Anchoring narratives around the development of a measurement instrument: instrument score Y (i.e., assumed to measure
cognitive load), known measure of the construct of interest Z (i.e., secondary task performance as a known measure of cognitive load), and
a comparative variable X (in our case: the conditions in a randomized controlled experiment).
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measure cognitive load. Given Z and X, the story that Y
measures cognitive load can be anchored if Y correlates
with Z as expected and covaries with Z across conditions
of X as expected in cognitive load theory.
Relating Y to X and Z when experiments are not feasible
Of course, depending on what is being measured and in
what context research occurs, randomized controlled exper-
iments may ethically or logistically be hard to realize (e.g.,
[6,12e15]), meaning that X must be operationalized through
careful comparisons of meaningful pre-existing groups and/
or repeated measurements on Y and Z. Although a common
association in this context has been that of expert-novice
comparisons, Cook23 reasons: “The major flaw is the
problem of confounding: there are multiple plausible
explanations for any observed between-group differences.
The absence of hypothesized differences would suggest a
serious flaw in the validity argument, but the confirmation of
such differences adds little. As such accurate known-groups
discrimination may be necessary, but will never be suffi-
cient, to support the validity of scores” (p. 829). In well-
designed randomized controlled experiments, confounding
is rarely an issue; hence, findings in the hypothesized direc-
tion typically provide a much stronger case for X-to-Y causal
inference when obtained in well-designed randomized
controlled experiments than when coming from known-
groups comparisons.
Nevertheless, there are cases when known-groups com-
parisons can be meaningful. One situation in which mean-
ingful pre-existing groups are found easily is in the context of
knowledge progress testing. In several medical curricula
across the world, the progress test is administered three to
four times every academic year. For instance, medical stu-
dents in the Netherlands complete four progress tests in each
of six academic years, yielding twenty-four progress test
measurements for every student. As such, the progress test
provides a powerful longitudinal tool for measuring knowl-
edge progress throughout the medical curriculum, and this
approach is based on a very solid theoretical framework.6
Suppose, researchers have developed a new computerized
adaptive progress test which is expected to provide about
the same information about students’ progress but with
fewer test items. They randomly sample 600 medical
students from the Netherlands e 100 students from each of
six academic years e and have them perform the new test
at a single point in time. Given that the existing progress
test is a very well-established instrument, if the new test
really measures knowledge progress amongmedical students,
score Y derived from the test should highly correlate with
score Z from the last regular progress tests that they
completed in the context of their curriculum and should
show differences between years X of a magnitude that is
similar to that of scores Z on previous progress tests in the
curriculum.
Unfortunately, some research contexts do not lend
themselves to meaningful comparisons of pre-existing
groups.23 However, even then, we are not left with empty
hands. In the OSCE example, for instance, if we have a
series of cases that have to be completed by all students in
a course, one might want to opt for counterbalancing the
order of cases and randomly assign students to different
orders. With three cases (A ¼ easiest, B ¼ more complex
than A, C ¼ more complex than B), for instance, that
would yield six orders (ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB,
CBA). Although this design is generally somewhat weaker
than a randomized controlled experiment because all
students undergoing all cases or conditions can come with
the risk of carryover effects (i.e., one’s performance on or
mere confrontation with a current case affects one’s
performance on a next case), this design does enable
collecting performance (Z) and cognitive load (Y)
measurements after each case, and the counterbalancing
enables accounting for order effects at least to some extent.24
Toward a chain of evidence: XeYeZ interrelations
confirmed, replicated, and meta-analysed
Generally speaking, when feasible, well-designed ran-
domized controlled experiments that are designed for the
sole purpose of validation can provide a stronger case for X-
to-Y causal inference than studies that involve meaningful
comparisons of pre-existing groups and/or repeated mea-
sures (e.g., counterbalanced order of conditions), given that
‘validating’ an instrument involves a structured sequence of
steps17,18 that together provide a chain of evidence.7,8
Finally, whether we take Messick’s unitary view of
validity,8 Kane’s argument-based approach7 or we apply
TAN to this context, whichever of the aforementioned
research designs we choose given our situation, a chain of
evidence is not established in a single study involving Xe
YeZ interrelations; we need replication studies3,25 to
enable the use of more powerful tools such as meta-
analysis and systematic review. This also holds for studies
the focus of which is not the development of instruments but
for example which instructional formats work for which
students.3
Developing an assessment story
In the previous section, we have seen that in the case of
empirical research the evaluation of evidence pertains to
integrating and anchoring a series of empirical studies with
theory and context. Analogously, in the case of assessing
competence, it is series of assessments that focus on a
competence of interest that need to be integrated and
anchored. For instance, assessing medical competence may
include OSCE performance, progress test scores, course
exams, interviews, and feedback from supervisors, patients
or others during residency. Most of these are administered
more than once, which is a good thing given that learning is
the product of strings of experiences, combinations of non-
linear trajectories, and social and cultural reifications11 and
given that every assessment has its limitations.9,10 Like
with empirical research using groups of participants (e.g.,
the development of a psychometric instrument), where
both numbers and qualitative input from interviews and
focus groups have a use (e.g., part of the support for the
statement that “Y results from a set of items that form a
stable factor” in Figure 2 may come from interview or
focus group data), Figure 3 illustrates that assessment is a
context where a considerable portion of information does
not come from numbers but from verbal and, in certain
cases, non-verbal data.
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Unfortunately, some of the discourse around assessment
has been led by some kind of quantitative-qualitative di-
chotomy, where a quantitative approach is equated with
‘psychometrics’ and a qualitative approach is equated with
‘interpretivist’. Due to this phenomenon, psychometrics is
associated with algorithms, reliability, and validity while an
interpretivist (i.e., qualitative) approach to assessment is
associated with triangulation of information, saturation of
information, trustworthiness, and credibility. Such a
dichotomous view on assessment ignores that psychometrics
is one but not the only quantitative approach to assessment,
fails to appreciate that some of the core assumptions un-
derlying quantitative data in educational research and
assessment are largely qualitative (e.g., the degree to which
an assessment covers a domain of interest, the extent to
which an assessment has face validity in the eye of an assessor
or the one who is assessed), and disregards that a qualitative
approach does not necessarily rule out the use of quantitative
information. Statistics and psychometrics are not only about
algorithms but also and perhaps largely about heuristics and
a qualitative judgement at all stages. At the same time, a
qualitative approach to assessment does not exclude nu-
merical information. In addition, a forced quantification of
what is in essence qualitative data may come with consider-
able loss of information and arbitrary decisions. Finally,
work by Wagenaar and colleagues as in TAN2 underlines
that reliability and validity are not exclusively quantitative
criteria: they matter in qualitative data as well. For
example, an eye-witness who tells the same story on
different occasions is highly reliable but without information
from other sources little, if anything, can be said about the
validity of this eyewitness’ story. Analogously, obtaining the
same scores for a group of people at different occasions may
indicate a high reliability but does not yet provide a quality
label for the validity of the instrument used.
To conclude: anchoring narratives as a core process
“Not everything that counts can be counted, and not
everything that can be counted counts”, is a quote attributed
to Albert Einstein. While single pieces of evidence may
provide quantitative information, for establishing the chain
of evidence (e.g., Figures 2 and 3) the qualitative professional
judgement cannot yet be replaced by a machine or calculator.
This does not mean that quantitative information is not
useful. In contrast, it appears impossible to imagine a
practice of science or assessment practice where
measurement and numbers have no place. Mathematics,
psychometrics, statistics, and the like provide essentially
very powerful tools for the mathematical modelling of
empirical phenomena, be it for group-based empirical
research or for the competence assessment of individuals.
However, no single number makes sense in isolation or
absence of supportive information. An exam score may
provide partial information on some aspect of competence
but needs to be evaluated in the light of other relevant
behaviour of the candidate that is assessed. A ‘very low’ p-
value (e.g., p < 0.001) in an experiment on a comparison
between a treatment and control condition has to be evalu-
ated in the context (e.g., theoretical framework, methodo-
logical choices, participant characteristics, nature of the data
at hand) in which a study has been carried out, and even then
it only starts to make sense when considering other relevant
research on the phenomenon, following up with replication
studies, and carrying out meta-analyses and systematic
reviews.
The concept of meta-analysis provides another example
of how important qualitative professional judgement is even
in an exercise that at first seems to be entirely quantitative
(e.g., effect sizes from each of the studies included in the
meta-analysis). After all, decisions with regard to the
Figure 3: Developing a story about an individual’s competence in a given context.
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inclusion or exclusion of studies in a meta-analysis as well as
concerning moderator variables cannot be made entirely
based on numbers: it requires professional knowledge of the
field, a closer study of candidate studies, and common sense.
Whether we are dealing with the question of the guilt or
innocence of a suspect in a criminal case, with a question that
calls for group-based empirical study or whether we wish to
assess a resident’s competence, qualitative and quantitative
pieces of evidence have to be anchored as narratives into a
chain of evidence with regard to a question of interest. As
such, any kind of qualitative-quantitative divide, such as we
have seen in the field of medical education, falls short and
should therefore be abandoned.
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